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Introduction
The major German tax reform of 2000/2001 has introduced many significant tax changes for corporations and may be used in many ways as a natural experiment to explore how tax sensitive firm decisions are. The reform reduced the federal corporate tax rate from 40 % for retained and 30 % for distributed earnings to a uniform rate of 25 % for all types of profits. It lowered depreciation allowances and abolished the full imputation system for taxing corporate profits.
1 These tax changes, of course, may have influenced the employment, investment and financing incentives of corporations.
2 This paper will concentrate on the special tax incentives for German corporations that, prior to the reform, had a fiscal year that was different from the calendar year. Due to special transition rules of the reform, corporations, under certain conditions, could save taxes by aligning their fiscal year with the calendar year and many firms indeed did take that option. Thirty-seven firms from a sample of 157 German listed firms (some 24 %) that had a fiscal year differing from the calendar year did in fact change in
2000.
In this paper we want to investigate whether the expected tax savings of a firm indeed can be used to systematically explain the observed changes. Our findings suggest that the probability of a change was significantly related to the expected tax savings. This implies that switches have only been undertaken when the benefits were sufficiently large to outweigh the costs of adjustment. The existence of those costs in turn suggests a non-negligible deadweight loss from lowering the tax rate that, of course, may be accompanied by a decrease in deadweight losses in other areas.
In the next section we will explain in more detail why firms could gain from an adjustment of their fiscal year. In Section 3 we set up an empirical model of this behavior before we interpret and conclude in Section 4.
Incentives for Changing the Fiscal Year
German corporations are not bound to the calendar year. While a corporation needs the consent of the fiscal authorities to depart from the calendar year once the fiscal year is aligned (Income tax code -EStG - § 4a), a newly set up corporation may retain such an uneven fiscal year forever. At the beginning of the year 2000, 157 of 989 listed German corporations had a fiscal year that differed from the calendar year. An alignment comes at a cost since it requires anticipating of future balance sheets and this additional accounting will not be cost free. There may also be a decision cost, as changing the fiscal year must be accepted by the shareholder meeting and has to be recorded in the companies' register (see Orth 2000) . Hence, not only were the profits generated during the first part of the fiscal year (marked by 3 "A1") subject to the high rate τ = 40 %, so too were the profits in the second half ("B1"). Now consider corporation 2 that decides to align the fiscal year. This alignment requires one fiscal year with less than twelve months ending on 31 st December 2000. During this period, labeled "A2", profits were taxed at 40 %, like in the case of corporation 1. However, unlike in the case of corporation 1, all profits that accrue in 2001 ("C2") are taxed at the lower rate of 25%.
Hence, the transitory rule gave a firm like corporation 1 an incentive to align the fiscal year and to act like corporation 2. The incentive is increasing in the expected profitability of the firm during period B1 and, given a positive stream of profits during period B1, it was also increasing in the length of period B1. 
Empirical Findings for Large German Corporations
In this section we will use publicly available data of German listed firms to evaluate whether the tax incentives have systematically influenced the decisions of German corporations to change their fiscal year. In total we identified 157 corporations that in 2000 had a non-aligned fiscal year and could potentially adapt to the incentives described above. Table 1 reports on the summary statistics of these firms. SAVE2001 is defined as PROFITS2001 times DAYS divided by 365. Assuming a constant profit stream over time, this gives a good proxy for the profits that could be subjected to the lower tax rate by changing the fiscal year. Table 2 On the other hand, there were no tax savings available on profits from inter-company dividends and this form of income should be also very important for holding companies, which account for some 13 % of our sample firms (20 companies). In the empirical models presented below we will therefore construct additional interactive variables using this dummy for holding companies.
If there is a cost of changing the fiscal year and this cost differs across firms, then we should expect that the propensity of firms to react is positively correlated with the possible tax savings and negatively with the non-tax cost of a change. We will now test this hypothesis empirically.
Since the variable to be explained, CHANGE, is a dummy, we employ PROBIT estimations rather than OLS. Before we set up the empirical model we define several additional variables. While the variable SAVE2001 is a plausible proxy for the tax savings if expected profits are positive, this is not the case for companies with negative profits. For those firms the advantage of changing the fiscal year should be independent of the size of the losses.
As laid out above, another possible difference arises with holding and non-holding companies.
The impact of SAVE2001 may be smaller for holding companies that usually receive a large part of their income as a dividend from other corporations. As mentioned above, for this type of income, changing the fiscal year brought no tax relief. Therefore we use SAVE2001 to construct four different variables:
These four variables allow the estimation of econometric models in which the effect of SAVE2001 is different depending on whether profits are positive or negative and depending on whether the firm under consideration is a holding company or not.
Tax savings may simply be large because the corporation is large. At the same time, we should expect that the cost of changing the fiscal year is more sizeable in bigger corporations. To separately identify the cost and benefit sides, we therefore have to include a proxy for the cost side. We chose total assets (ASSETS 2001) as such a proxy on the grounds that setting up an additional balance sheet to align the fiscal year will be more costly in a large corporation. Thus, we expect a negative influence of this variable on the probability to align the fiscal year in the empirical analysis.
The first two columns of Table 3 report our results for two simple PROBIT models.
The model in column (1) includes the full set of right hand side variables. As expected, for profitable non-holding companies, the variable SAVE2001 affects the switching probability positively. The variable is significant at the five percent level. The holding company dummy is also positive and significant. This implies that on average holdings did change more often than non-holding companies. This should reflect the benefit of holding companies for sales of participations under the new tax code. On the other hand, the variable SAVE2001_POS_HDG
is not significant at conventional levels. As mentioned above, this is not surprising, given a predominance of inter-company dividends in the income of holding companies. Thus holdings are relatively insensitive to the variable SAVE2001.
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If the profitability is negative and therefore no taxes are due we should expect no influence of the size of the profitability. Indeed, this is indicated by the insignificance of SAVE2001_NEG and SAVE2001_NEG_HDG.
As expected, our proxy for the cost of changing the fiscal year, ASSETS2001 is negative and significant at the five percent level.
Column (2) presents a more parsimonious model. A test performed on model (1) showed that the assumption that the excluded variables are jointly different from zero could not be rejected at conventional levels. The comparison of models (1) and (2) shows that the results are robust against exclusion of these insignificant variables. Both models correctly predict the decision to align the fiscal year in about 78 percent of cases. Annotations: *** significant at 1%-level; ** significant at 5%-level; * significant at 10%-level. Dependent variable: WECHSEL. P-values in brackets are based on robust t-statistics. All regressions contained a constant, coefficients are not reported.
A possible problem that may arise in the simple PROBIT models (1) and (2) Results from the IV-PROBIT model that uses the instrumented values of SAVE2001_POS are presented in column (3). The signs of the variables are the same as in model (2) but they are more significant than those for the simple PROBIT model. For example, the variable of prime interest, SAVE2001_POS, is now significant at the 1 per cent level rather than at the 5 per cent level. Similarly, p-value for ASSETS2001 has also decreased. A possible reason for these improved results is that corporations had to decide on their fiscal year policy on the basis of predicted profits rather than actual profits. Given the partial knowledge about actual tax savings from a change, the instrumented variable may not only correct for a possible bias but may also model firm decisions in a more appropriate way.
Indeed this seems to be the driving force here, as a Hausman test performed on models (3) and (2) found no systematic differences in the coefficients and therefore does not suggest a bias. 
Conclusion
In this paper we examined the decision of 157 German listed corporations to change their fiscal year in 2000. Theoretically, the gains from such a behavior were larger, the larger the expected profits that could be shifted from a fiscal year with a 40 % tax rate to a changed fiscal year with a lower rate of 25 %. However, if there are costs of changing, then not all firms that expect a gain may do so. The empirical analysis presented in Section 3 indeed provides clear evidence that the propensity to change the fiscal year was significantly related to the amount of expected tax savings. This strongly suggests that the corporate tax reduction in combination with the special German transitory provisions induced a deadweight loss:
corporations incurred non-tax costs to avoid a tax cost.
